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  Abstract 
 
 
We establish a new empirical finding that the intensity of search for the best price affects the 
frequency of nominal price changes. This relationship holds in very different economies and for 
various proxies for search intensity. We derive this relationship from a model of 
monopolistically competitive firms that face menu costs of changing nominal prices and 
heterogeneous consumers who search for the best price. We discuss alternative explanations and 
argue that they do not explain the observed correlations. Our results establish that pricing 
policies differ endogenously in the cross-section. This may be an important feature missing in 
many macroeconomic models based on nominal rigidities with exogenous frequency of price 
changes. 
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research assistance. The first author would like to thank the European Center of Advanced 
Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES), Université Libre, Brussels, Belgium, where 
part of this work was done, for its hospitality and acknowledges financial support from Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, grant # 410-96-0245. An earlier draft of 
this paper was titled “A New Test of the Menu Cost Model”.   1
1. Introduction. 
  Rigidity of nominal prices is a fact of life. With the exception of auction markets (for 
example, financial markets), prices change infrequently. The average frequency of price changes 
is about four times a year in the US (Bils and Klenow, 2004) and less than twice a year in Europe 
(Dhyne et al, 2005). The frequency differs greatly over individual goods and over broad good 
categories. The properties of these discontinuous price strategies of individual price setters are 
not only of intrinsic interest but also have crucial implications for the consequences of monetary 
policies. In the vast literature based on the Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983) frameworks
1, 
infrequent individual price changes (which are often treated as exogenous) are the main 
microfoundation of aggregate nominal rigidity and the reason monetary policy has real effects.  
  It is difficult to distinguish between various theories of nominal rigidity using macro 
models. Our goal is to provide a better understanding of the nominal rigidity by looking at 
individual pricing decisions. . We establish a new empirical finding and analyze an equilibrium 
model that explains it. We find that the intensity of consumer search for the best price affects the 
frequency of price adjustment: price changes are more frequent and smaller in markets in which 
search is more intense. The relationship we document is both statistically and economically 
significant. In our model, which is related to Bénabou (1992), customers are heterogeneous and 
search for the best price.
2 Competing firms face costs to adjust nominal prices. We show that 
equilibrium pricing strategies are affected by market characteristics related to the intensity of 
consumer search and that the model predicts the patterns observed in the data. 
  The empirical relationship we discover holds in two very different data sets. The first set 
(Bils and Klenow (2004)), consists of prices collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1995-
7; these prices cover 70% of US CPI. The data are divided in 350 groups; for each group we 
have the average monthly probability of price changes in a given month. We proxy search 
intensity with the group's weight in CPI expenditure. The second data set consists of store-level, 
actual transactions prices for 55 products and services in Poland, each observed monthly in up to 
47 stores, over 1992-96. Following the classic Stigler (1961) paper,  we proxy search intensity 
depends on the value of purchases, the good’s importance in household expenditure (conditional 
                                                 
1 Yun (1996), Gali and Gertler (1999), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000), Sbordone (2002), Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) are some examples of this large and expanding literature.  
2 The main difference between our model and Bénabou (1992) is that we assume that each consumer buys a fixed 
amount of the good, while in Bénabou (1992) each customer has a downward-sloping demand. This simplification 
allows us to establish analytically the uniqueness of equilibrium and derive comparative statics results.   2
on the household buying the good) and the frequency of purchases. Despite the very different 
environments (for example, the average CPI inflation is below 3% in the US and about 30% in 
Poland), we find strong support for the predictions of the model in both data sets. 
  We calibrate the model using direct information on menu costs from Levy et. al. (1997), 
to fit the 1992-96 average frequency of price changes in the Polish data. The model is able to fit 
the data quantitatively for high-inflation economies. For low-inflation countries it fits the data 
qualitatively but does a poor job quantitatively. This is broadly consistent with Golosov and 
Lucas (2003), who stress the importance of real shocks in low-inflation environment.  
  We consider several alternative explanations of the observed correlations: Taylor-Calvo’s 
time-contingent model, Kashyap’s (1995) price-contingent model, Diamond’s (1993) sticker 
price model as well as temporary sales and argue that they cannot explain the patterns in the data. 
We also discuss Rotemberg’s (2002) customer resistance model. This model has the potential to 
fit the data under two additional assumptions: consumer resistance leads to smaller and more 
frequent price changes and it is stronger in markets we identify as having more intensive 
customer search. If so, more research on the effects of aggregate variables is needed to 
differentiate the two models. 
  The effects of nominal shocks and welfare consequences of alternative monetary policies 
are directly related to the frequency of individual price adjustment and the causes of nominal 
rigidity. Our results point out that the underlying assumptions in the Taylor-Calvo frameworks 
may be too restrictive. Aggregate models based on the Taylor-Calvo framework use the average 
frequency of price changes obtained from the data as an exogenous parameter underlying the 
behaviour of homogenous price setters. Firms are usually ex-ante identical and heterogeneity is 
ignored. But, as argued by Carvalho (2005), dynamic properties of aggregate models are affected 
by ex-ante heterogeneity.
3  
   Data show large, and remarkably consistent across countries, differences in the 
frequency of price changes across broad good categories. Bils and Klenow (2004) report that 
price changes are more frequent for raw than for processed goods. In both the US and Polish data 
we find that the price changes are most frequent for unprocessed food, followed by processed 
food, manufactured products and services. The same differences hold in recently  obtained, 
                                                 
3 Similarly, Caballero and Engle (1991, 1993) find that aggregate behaviour of economies with state-contingent 
pricing is affected by firm heterogeneity.   3
extensive data sets for several European countries.
4 Notably, differences across goods greatly 
exceed differences across countries. On the average, services are the most heterogeneous, 
followed by manufactured goods, durable foodstuffs and perishable foodstuffs. Similarly, 
processed goods are more heterogeneous than raw products. Our search-based explanation of the 
cross-sectional heterogeneity is consistent with these empirical observations. Intensity of search 
for the best price is likely to be affected by non-price differences between goods (for example 
quality differences across different sellers). The larger are non-price differences, the smaller is 
the effect of given price differences on the search for the best price and so our model implies less 
frequent price adjustments.  
  Finally, our results show that pricing policies differ endogenously in the cross-section. 
This, together with the accounting for the substantial cross-sectional heterogeneity, may be an 
important feature missing in many macroeconomic models based on nominal rigidities with 
exogenous, homogeneous frequency of price changes. 
There are several empirical studies of the cross-sectional variation. Carlton (1986), 
Caucutt, Gosh and Kelton (1999) and Bils and Klenow (2004) study the effects of market 
concentration. The hypothesis is that demand is more elastic in more competitive markets and 
hence, plausibly, firms change nominal prices more frequently. Empirical evidence is consistent 
with this hypothesis; however, Bils and Klenow (2004) find that it is not robust. Caucutt, Gosh 
and Kelton (1999) find that prices of durable goods change less often. Dhyne et al (2005) regress 
the probability of price changes on several variables and find that it is lower for firms which tend 
to charge “attractive” prices (prices that are round or end with a nine), for firms with regulated 
prices and in smaller shops than in supermarkets. Finally, Levy et al (1997), Owen and Trzepacz 
(2002) and Levy et al (2005) find that firms with higher price adjustment costs change prices less 
often. Except for the last relationship, which follows from Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) 
theoretical explanations of these relationships remain to be developed. 
  We begin by presenting the model in the next section. Empirical evidence is in Section 3. 
In Section 4 we provide a simple extension of the model which can account for the large 
                                                 
4 The data sets consist of CPI source data and cover between 65% and 100% of the CPI: Álvarez and Hernando 
(2004) for Spain, Aucremanne and Dhyne (2004) for Belgium, Baudry et al (2004) for France, Baugartner et al 
(2005) for Austria, Dias et al (2004) for Portugal and Vilmunen and Laakonen (2004) for Finland. In addition, 
Hoffmann and KurzKim (2005), Jonker et al (2004), Lünnemann and Mathä (2005) and Veronese et al (2005) 
analyze smaller data sets for Germany, Holland, Luxemburg and Italy, respectlively. In all these studies the ranking 
of frequencies across broad good categories is the same as in the US and in the Polish data; see Dhyne et al (2005), 
table 3.    4
observed differences in the average frequency of price changes between groups of goods. In 
Section 5 we discuss alternative explanations of the patterns in the data. Last section concludes. 
 
2.   Menu Costs, Search Intensity and Price Changes. 
In this section we develop an equilibrium model of search for the best price in the 
presence of menu costs and inflation. In a seminal paper, Stigler (1961) argued that the amount 
of search depends on (a) the fraction of the buyer’s expenditure on the commodity, (b) the 
fraction of repetitive (experienced) buyers in the market (provided the correlation between 
successive prices in a given store is positive), (c) the fraction of repetitive sellers and (d) the 
geographical size of the market. The importance of the first three factors is mostly due to the 
effect of repeated purchases on the ratio of search costs to expenditure on the good. If the good is 
purchased rarely (relative to the frequency of price changes) or if sellers stay in the market for a 
short time, price information obtained in the previous search is of no use to the buyer and each 
purchase requires bearing the full search cost. On the other hand, if purchases are repetitive and 
buying from the same store again is possible then, once a store with low prices has been 
identified, the buyer may continue to patronize the store and save on search costs.
5 The 
geographic size of the market (more precisely, store density) affects the cost of a single search. 
The expenditure on a good matters either in case of frequent, small purchases (for example 
bread) or rare but high value purchases (for example a TV set). 
The exact implementation of all these considerations in an equilibrium search model with 
costly price adjustment is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we proxy these factors with 
several variables which affect the intensity of search in a clear manner.  
The model is a blend of the MacMinn (1980) and Carlson and McAfee (1983) models of 
costly search with heterogeneous consumers and the Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) model of 
costly price adjustment.  
We consider a market for a single good produced by a continuum of long-lived firms and 
purchased by a continuum of short-lived consumers. We first characterize the equilibrium with a 
fixed number of firms and then allow for free entry and exit to determine it endogenously. In the 
model without entry we normalize the measure of firms to 1. All variables are expressed in real 
                                                 
5 Another way of saving search cost, mentioned by Stigler (1961, p. 219) is pooling of information when buyers 
compare prices. Search cost may also be reduced by checking out several prices during one shopping trip, for 
example prices of several kinds of groceries during one visit to a store.   5
terms. All firms have the same constant marginal cost, MC, of supplying the good. They set 
nominal prices so as to maximize profits. Nominal prices are eroded at the constant (expected) 
inflation rate g. Each nominal price change entails a fixed cost m, the same for all firms. We 
assume that the sellers satisfy demand at the posted prices. 
Each period a new cohort of consumers arrives at the market. Their number is v so, in the 
absence of entry, v is the relative measure of the number of consumers to the number of firms. 
Each consumer buys 0 or k units of the good and then exits the market. This is the main 
difference from Bénabou (1992) who assumes that individual demand is a smooth function of 
price. The simplification allows us to show below that the equilibrium is unique and establish the 
comparative statics. As prices of the good differ across firms, consumers search for the best 
price. Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to the search cost, c, which is distributed in 
each cohort uniformly over the range [0,C]. Each consumer chooses his search strategy to 
minimize the expected purchase cost, E[kP+Nc],  where P is the price paid and N is the total 
number of searches conducted. We assume that the value of the good to every consumer is high 
enough so that all buy k units of the product in equilibrium. Consumers form their search rules 
based on the expected (equilibrium) distribution of prices f(P). Their search behavior yields a 
demand function for all producers, q(P).
6  
2.1. The Consumer’s Problem. 
Suppose that equilibrium prices are distributed according to a pdf  f. Let type c denote a 
consumer whose search cost is c. Consider type c who finds a price quotation P. He has to decide 
whether to accept it or to search for a lower price in a different store. He is indifferent if: 
∫ − =
P
dx x f x P k c
0
) ( ) (       ( 1 )  
Denote by P
*(c) the price that solves this equation. As is standard in search models (see, 
for example, Carlson and McAfee (1983) or Tommasi (1994)), the optimal search rule takes the 
form of a reservation price: type c continues to search for a lower price until he finds a quote not 
higher than P
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6 Implicitly we make the standard assumption that the search is instantaneous and consumption cannot be postponed.  
See Bénabou (1992) for more discussion.    6
so firms with lower prices face higher demand. Denote by  ) (
* P c the inverse of P
*(c). The 
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The intuition is as follows. The density of consumers per unit of search costs is v/C. A 
firm charging price P sells k units of the good to all customers sampling its price whose search 
cost exceeds c*(P). Conversely, a customer who has a search cost c can buy the good from 
F(P*(c)) firms (recall the number of firms is normalized at one). The term under the integral is 
each firm’s share of type c consumers.  
Using equations (2) and (3) we obtain demand:  
) ) ( * ( ) (
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where P*(C) is the reservation price of the buyer with the highest cost of search – the largest 
willingness to pay. From the definition we have that  [ ] *( ) / PC C kE P =+ , where E[P] is the 
average price in the market. To simplify notation denote 
2 *( ),    / . APC bv kC ≡≡  The demand 
function can be rewritten as:
   
[]
2
() (/ ) ( )
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qP C k EP P bA P
C
=+ − = −      (4) 
The three market-specific variables: the number of units bought by each consumer, k, the 
size of search costs (measured by their range, [0,C]) and the number of consumers, v, affect 
search intensity for the best price as perceived by the firm.  C and k impact search intensity of 
each customer, by changing the search cost per unit purchased. The effect of v is less direct. 
Changes in v affect search intensity as perceived by the firm: as is the case with changes in C and 
in k, they affect the responsiveness of demand to the difference between a firm’s price and the 
average price in the market. 
2.2. The Firm’s Problem. 
Given that there is a mass of firms, one firm’s decisions do not affect the price 
distribution or prices of the remaining firms, so we can treat each firm as monopolistically 
competitive. Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) showed that, if demand is stationary and the inflation   7
rate is constant, the optimal pricing policy is of the  (s,S) type: the firm waits until the real price 
P depreciates to s and then raises the nominal price so that P equals S. Assume, for simplicity, 
that the real discount rate is zero. At the time of the first price change the firm maximizes the 
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2.3 Equilibrium. 
Clearly, the optimal pricing rules depend on demand, which in turns depends on E[P]. If 
all firms follow the same (s,S) policy, the distribution of prices depends on whether price 
changes are staggered or synchronized. As shown in Caplin and Spulber (1987) and Bénabou 
(1988), the only time-invariant distribution of prices is log-uniform: 
 
Lemma (Bénabou 1988): 
If a continuum of price setters follow identical (s, S) rules with respect to some index inflating at 
a constant rate g, the only cross-sectional distribution of their real prices which is invariant over 
time is log-uniform over (s, S]. Under this invariant distribution, the average price in the market 
grows at the rate g. 
 
This distribution of prices arises if the dates of the most recent price adjustment are 
distributed uniformly across firms over [-T, 0). Hence we consider staggered rather than 
synchronized price policies. This assumption generates stationary demands and validates our 
analysis of the firm’s problem. As Bénabou (1988) argues there are three reasons why this 
assumption is justified: optimality, macroeconomic consistency and stability. First, with any 
other distribution, search and demand are non-stationary, which makes the (s, S) rule suboptimal. 
Second, other distributions of prices result in the average price level not increasing smoothly at 
the rate g. Finally, if the bounds (s, S) differ slightly between firms (Caplin and Spulber 1987) or   8
firms follow a randomized (s, S) strategy to limit storage by speculators (Bénabou 1989), then 
any initial distribution of real prices converges to this steady-state distribution. 
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This allows us to define equilibrium in the market: 
A (stationary) equilibrium is a pair (s, S) specifying each firm’s pricing rule which is optimal 
given the demand it faces; the (stationary) log-uniform distribution of prices given by the policy 
rule; and the search strategy of each consumer that is optimal given the distribution of prices. 
 
Following our previous discussion, the equilibrium is characterized by (s, S) that satisfy 
the two conditions for firm’s optimality (6) and the aggregate condition that the average market 
price is consistent with firms’ strategies, (8). Expanding equations (6) we obtain that the 
equilibrium is described by the following system of equations: 
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 Equation (9a) can be rewritten as: 
 s = A + MC - S       ( 1 0 )  
As we are interested mainly in how the frequency of price changes varies with the 
parameters of the model, we define  s S = σ ;  σ is the ratio of the initial to terminal real price. 
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We first prove that, for any given E[P] (high enough so that it is possible for the firms to earn 
nonnegative profits), the firm’s problem has a unique solution. All proofs are in Appendix A. 
 
Lemma. For any given  [ ] 0 EP≥ , if there exist pricing strategies that yield nonnegative profits 
and 2/
C
k MC gm b >− , then the firm’s problem has a unique solution. Furthermore, for a given 
E[P]>C/k - MC , the optimal σ  is decreasing in k , v and MC and increasing in C.  
 
We can now address the question of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. A 
necessary condition for the existence of equilibrium is that the model parameters: k, v, C and MC 
are such that the firms profits are nonnegative. From (6) profits are nonnegative if and only if 
s≥MC. Using (11a) and (11c) this is equivalent to: 






−− ≥ , where σ is the equilibrium 
value found by solving (11b) and (11c). For the rest of this section we assume that this condition 




k MC gm b >− , then there exists a unique equilibrium. 
    
  The final step is to show the relationship between model parameters, the equilibrium 
σ and the frequency of price changes. 
  
Proposition 2: 
(a) Assume  2/
C
k MC gm b >− . The equilibrium size of price changes,σ , is increasing in g and 
m and decreasing in MC, v and k. Furthermore, if MC>C/k, the equilibrium σ  is also increasing 
in C. 
 
(b) The frequency of price changes is decreasing in m and increasing in MC, v and k.  If MC>C/k 
then the frequency is decreasing in C. Finally, the frequency is increasing in g. 
 
(c) Define the coefficient of variation as: 
2 [] /[] [ ( ) ] /[] C V S T DP EP E P E P EP == − . CV is 
increasing in the frequency of price changes.   10
2.4. Entry and Exit. 
  When there is free entry and exit, the number of firms (measured in the model by v) will 
adjust until the average profits per unit of time are zero: π = 0. If the fixed cost of production 
and the cost of entry are zero, the solution to the model must meet s=MC (see equation (6)). This 







) ln 1 ( 1 − −
=       ( 1 2 )  
  By Proposition 1, there exists a unique value ofσ as a function of the parameters of the 
model, in particular as a function of  v. From Appendix equation (A5) which determines the 
equilibrium, after some straightforward algebra we obtain that the relationship between g, m and 
v  in equilibrium is: 
()
22 ()1 / () (/ )/ ( ) / hH C k M C C k m g v σσ ⎡⎤ ++ = ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦      ( 1 3 )  
where the functions  () h σ  and  () H σ are defined in the Appendix A. By equation (12), in a free-
entry equilibrium the left side of (13) is independent of the parameters on the right hand side. 
Therefore changes in the inflation rate and in price adjustment costs affect the number of firms in 
equilibrium. The higher is inflation and/or the higher is the price adjustment cost in a given 
market, the smaller is the number of firms in the industry. Inflation and/or adjustment costs 
affect the frequency of price changes but, unlike in the absence of entry, has no effect on price 
bounds and on the size of adjustment. 
  Equations (12) and (13), together with Proposition 2, imply the following comparative 
statics in free-entry equilibrium: 
Proposition 2a:  
If the equilibrium number of firms is determined by free entry, then the size of price changes, σ , 
is not affected by m and g, is increasing in C and decreasing in k and MC. The frequency of price 
changes is not affected by m, increasing in g, k and MC and decreasing in C. 
 
  When the fixed costs of production per unit of time, F, are positive, the free-entry 
condition becomes: 
g F s / ) ln( ) ( σ π =       ( 1 4 )  
  The explicit characterization of the equilibrium in this case is tedious. Numerical 
calculations suggest that comparative statics like in Proposition 2 continue to hold for parameter   11
values close to the ones calibrated in Section 2.6, with the exception of k, which has a non-
monotonic effect. 
2.5. Summary and Intuition. 
We now summarize the implications of the model. The explicit consideration of search 
does not alter the effects of inflation on the optimal pricing policy from those in the basic 
Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) model (except in the free entry case). As the inflation rate 
increases, price changes become larger and, given the form of the profit function, more frequent. 
Firms with larger menu cost change prices less often and by larger amounts. In addition, the 
higher is the marginal cost, the more frequent and larger are price changes. 
The main results concern the effects of the three search-related variables on the size and 
frequency of price changes.  These effects are unambiguous. The model predicts that, in markets 
in which search is intensive (due to low search costs, large customer’s purchases, or a large 
number of customers), price changes are small and frequent.  
In Figure 1we show the effects of changes in the inflation rate, search cost, C, and in the 
number of customers on the equilibrium values of the price bounds and of the probability and 
size of price changes.  The effect of inflation is shown in the top panels of Figure 1. With higher 
inflation the price bounds move further apart, and both the size and the probability of adjustment 
increase. The effects of changes in the search cost, are shown in the middle panels of Figure 1. 
Higher search costs reduce the competitiveness of the market and raise monopolistic markups, 
increasing both price bounds. The probability of price changes falls and the size of adjustment 
rises. Finally, in the bottom panels we show the effect of the changes in the number of 
customers. With more customers the price bounds move closer together, price changes become 
smaller and the probability of adjustment increases.
7  
What is responsible for the differences in the frequency of price changes across firms and 
markets? The optimal frequency of price changes depends on the curvature of the profit function. 
If profits decline fast as the real price varies from its momentary profit-maximizing value, firms 
prefer to keep their prices within tighter bounds and pay the menu cost more often. In our case 
the real profit function is: 
2
() ( [] ) ( ) vk C
Ck PE P P P M C π =+ − −  
                                                 
7 The effects of changes in k are more complex. Higher k simultaneously reduces the cost of search per unit and 
shifts out the demand function; the net effect is to reduce both price bounds, raise the frequency and reduce the size 
of price changes.    12
For a quadratic profit function π(P) = a+bP+cP
2, when price is x percent away from the 
optimum, the profits are lower by -x²b²/4c. For our profit function -b²/4c is 
2 [( [ ] ) ] / 4 vCk E P M C C ⋅+ + , which is increasing in v, k, MC, and is decreasing in C (assuming 
that C/k is less than E[P] +  MC). Of course that alone allows only for a partial equilibrium 
argument about the relationship between the frequency of price changes and the parameters as 
some of the parameters of the profit function depend also on the strategies of other firms, via the 
average market price and, in the model with free entry, also via v.  
Interestingly, the relationship between adjustment frequency and firm size is ambiguous. 
Intuition suggests that large firms should change prices more often since, for such firms, the cost 
of price changes are less important (Buckley and Carlson, 2000). But while, ceteris paribus, 
smaller menu costs mean more frequent price changes, the relationship between adjustment 
frequency and firm size depends on why the firm is large. By Proposition 2, efficient firms with 
low marginal costs change prices infrequently. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the equilibrium with entry is consistent with empirical 
studies, which find a positive correlation between inflation and the frequency of price changes, 
but are mixed on the effect of inflation on the size of price adjustment (see Proposition 2a). 
2.6. Calibration. 
We now turn to calibrating the model to address three questions. We begin by asking 
whether our model can generate price behavior observed in the data with reasonable parameter 
values. We then use the initial calibrated values and check whether the response of frequency of 
price changes to inflation is similar in the model to that in data taken from a single source. 
Finally, we ask whether a single calibration can account for observations from different 
countries. The answers are yes, yes and no. 
To pin down the parameters of the model, we use data from Levy et al (1997), who 
provide direct information on menu costs.
 They estimate the size of menu costs on the basis of 
direct observation of the price changing process in several large US grocery chains. They report 
that the average cost of price change is $0.52, which equals 31% of the average cost of an item 
($1.70). The yearly cost of price change is $4.23 per product; it is $0.0119 per item sold (see 
their Table 4), which implies the average monthly volume of sales (vk in our model) is 30. The 
gross margin is 25% and the total menu cost is 0.7% of all revenues and 2.8% of the gross 
margin.   13
We use this information to calibrate the model to the adjustment probability and the 
inflation rate in our proprietary, Polish data set (this data set allows us to answer the second 
question). The calibration is a somewhat arbitrary exercise as various crucial parameters may be 
different in these data; for example Polish stores are smaller, competition and search incentives 
may differ, the inflation rate is much higher than in Levy et al (1997) etc. Hence it should be 
understood as an illustration of the model. 
To fit these numbers we set MC=1, so that all reported values are in the units of the good. 
We chose k=1 and v=30. We then computed the values of the menu cost, m, and the maximum 
search cost, C, so that gross margin is 25%, the menu cost is 31% of the average price in the 
market and the probability of price change is 0.32 when the inflation rate is 2.23% per month – 
the average values for 1992-96 in the Polish data (see Table 1). The resulting numbers are 
m=0.4155 and C=0.334. With these numbers the average cost of search for the best price is 
16.7% of the average cost of a unit purchased, the price bounds are s=1.287, S=1.381, the 
average price in the market, E[P], is  1.333 and the percentage price change is 7.3%.
8 These 
numbers appear reasonable and we conclude that, despite its simplicity, the model is able to 
capture some of the most relevant aspects of the data. 
The next issue concerns the dynamic properties of our model. We ask whether it can 
replicate the empirical relationship between inflation and the frequency of price changes. To do 
this we compute the predicted probability of price change for individual years in the data, using 
the calibrated parameter values and that year’s inflation rate. The results of this exercise are in 
the top part of Table 2 and in the upper panel of Figure 2. It is clear that the model does a good 
job matching the relationship between inflation and frequency of price changes in the Polish 
data.  
Finally, we compute the predicted frequency of price changes for data from other 
countries, using the calibrated parameter values and the relevant inflation rates. They are divided 
into two parts: high inflation (which includes studies using Argentinean
9, Hungarian, Israeli and 
Polish data) and low inflation (Austrian, Belgian, Canadian, Finnish, French, Portuguese, 
Spanish, US and Internet data). For each data set, Table 2 shows the yearly inflation rate, the 
                                                 
8 This number is equal to the average price change in our data. However, unlike in the model, we also observe price 
decreases (19% of price changes). The average price increase in our data is 11% - see Table 1 for more details.  
9 The data in Tommasi (1993, in his Table 3) cover 45 weeks. We restricted the comparison to the last 35 weeks, 
when the inflation rate is relatively stable (between –6% and +10% per week; excluding the two extreme values it is 
between –2% and 5% per week). In the first 10 weeks the inflation rate is between –5% and +38% per week.   14
actual and the predicted frequencies of price change as well as the prediction error, measured as 
the percentage difference between the predicted and actual values. For convenience we illustrate 
the data in Figure 2, which shows the actual frequency of price changes for various studies as 
well as the predicted relationship between the inflation rate and the frequency. 
Despite the heroic assumption that the different economies have similar underlying 
parameters, the model does a reasonable job for high-inflation environments. Except for two 
extreme values, the predicted value is within 20% of the actual value. Both extreme values are 
likely due to the coverage of products in the data. Sheshinski, Tishler and Weiss (1981) data are 
for regulated products. Ratfai’s (2001) data are mostly for unprocessed meats and, as discussed 
below, price changes are more frequent for raw products and for perishable foodstuffs than for 
other goods.  
On the other hand, the same calibration cannot account for the relationship in low-
inflation environments. Prediction errors are between –95% (for Levy et al, 1997) and 780% (for 
the maximum duration reported by Cecchetti, 1986). With the exception of Kashyap’s (1995) 
and Álvarez and Hernando (2004) data, they are all much larger, often by order of magnitude, 
than in high inflation countries. Nor can the errors be explained by good types. The frequencies 
of price changes in the seven comprehensive data sets (Bils and Klenow, 2004, Álvarez and 
Hernando, 2004, Aucremanne and Dhyne, 2004, Baugartner et al 2005, Beaudry et al, 2004, 
Dias, Dias and Neves, 2004 and Vilmunen and Laakonen, 2004, all of which cover over 65% of 
consumer expenditure in the respective country) are much higher than predicted by the model 
calibrated to the Polish, i.e. high inflation, data (see the lower panel of Figure 2).
10  
3. Empirical Results. 
  Empirical testing of our model requires data that, ideally, consist of detailed price 
information for individual goods in individual stores as well as information on search patterns of 
customers who buy these goods in these particular locations. Such data are not available. Hence 
we resort to data with detailed price information and use proxies for consumer search. Our tests, 
therefore, are joint tests of whether menu costs and consumer search can explain the probability 
of price changes, and whether the proxy we use is an adequate measure of search behaviour. We 
                                                 
10 The first four studies for low-inflation countires reported in Table 2 present a bit different picture, but we believe 
that this is caused by a small number of markets studied. Dahlby (1992) and Kashyap (1995) study markets in which 
there are obstacles to price changes (regulated car insurance and catalogue products, respectively).  Fisher and 
Konieczny (2004) and Cecchetti (1986) analyze prices of newspapers and magazines; for reasons that are not 
immediately apparent these do not change often. Chakrabarti and Scholnick (2001) study prices on the internet, 
where the cost of price adjustment is lower than in traditional stores.   15
use two data sets. The first consists of BLS data in Bils and Klenow (2004). These data are 
comprehensive, covering almost 70% of US CPI. They contain the probabilities of price change 
for groups of goods, rather than for individual products. We use the share of expenditure as a 
proxy for the importance of the good in household expenditure and so for search intensity. As 
discussed below, there are significant problems with this proxy. Nonetheless, when we control 
for the differences between broad good categories, there is a strong positive association between 
the weight and the frequency of price changes that is both statistically, and economically, 
significant. The second data set is a proprietary Polish data set. While it is much less 
comprehensive than the BLS data, it consists of actual prices at the level of individual 
goods/stores. To measure search intensity we use the classification we created for an earlier 
paper (Konieczny and Skrzypacz, 2000) where we analyzed the effect of search intensity on the 
dispersion of price level across stores. That classification follows Stigler’s (1961) suggestions 
more closely and look at various aspects of search: expenditure on a given good (conditional on 
the household buying it), the size of individual purchase and the frequency of purchases. It also 
allows us to test model implications on the relationship between search intensity and the size of 
price changes. As with the US data, despite problems with search proxies, we find strong support 
for the model. 
Infrequent Observations Bias. 
Testing the model involves the analysis of differences in the probability of price changes 
across  goods or groups of goods. When prices are not observed  continuously (as is the case 
with essentially all existing data sets, and in particular with both the BLS and the Polish data), 
these differences are biased downward. We call it the infrequent observation bias. 
 Assume prices are observed once per period and let Pijt denote the price of good i in store 
j in period t. Whenever 0 < Pijt-1 < Pijt  is observed, it is assumed that there was a single change 
of the price of good i in store j in period t. If there are instances of multiple price changes 
between t-1 and t, the sample frequency is lower than in the true data.  
Assume (reasonably) that the higher is the sample frequency of price changes, the larger 
is the incidence of multiple adjustments during a given period. This means that the downward 
bias of sample frequency is stronger for goods that change prices often. Hence the cross-  16
sectional variation of the probability of the price changes is smaller in the sample than in the true 
data.   This biases the estimated coefficients towards zero.
11 
3.1. U.S. Data and the Search Proxy. 
The first source of evidence is the data set used by Bils and Klenow (2004); they describe 
it in detail. It contains the pricing information Bureau of Labour Statistics collects in order to 
calculate CPI. The data cover almost 70% of U.S. consumer expenditure. They are grouped into 
the so – called entry level items (ELIs). For years 1995-97, Table 1 in Bils and Klenow (2004) 
provides the probability of price changes and weight in CPI for each of the 350 ELIs. A 
summary of the probability of adjustment data is in Table 1. The average probability of price 
change is about ¼. The probability depends on good type. It is much lower for services (1/9), 
similar to the average for manufactured goods and for durable foodstuffs, and much higher for 
perishable foodstuffs (2/5).
12 
To test the hypothesis that more intensive search leads to higher frequency of price 
changes, we treat ELIs’ weights in CPI as a proxy for the average importance in expenditure, and 
so for search intensity, of the goods included in a given ELI. In our model it corresponds to a 
high value of k.  
 There are a couple of problems with using CPI expenditure weights as a proxy for search 
intensity. First, what matters for search is not the weight of a given good in total expenditure, but 
rather its importance for  households who actually buy it. Second,  CPI weights are affected by 
the construction of ELIs.              
ELIs group together items BLS considers similar. BLS may include in a single ELI goods 
with different search intensity, and in particular with different weight in consumer expenditure. 
Consider, for example, ELI 55034 (hearing aids – with 0.024% weight in US CPI) and ELI 
30032 (microwave ovens – with 0.03% weight in US CPI). The weights in expenditure are 
similar, but we expect search to be much more intensive for the first ELI, since hearing aids tend 
to be expensive items bought by few households and constitute a much larger portion of 
expenditure than microwaves for households that buy them. This problem applies, in general, to 
all goods and services and so would be present even if expenditure data for individual products 
were available.     
                                                 
11 As reported below, the infrequent observation bias is unlikely to affect the qualitative results. 
12 The classification of ELIs into types is available on request.   17
Second, CPI weights are affected by the construction of ELIs, especially by the number 
and heterogeneity of goods in an ELI. An ELI with a large weight in CPI may consist of a small 
number of goods that are important in consumer expenditure, or it may consist of a larger 
number of less important goods. For example, we expect search to be more intensive for goods in 
ELI 9011 (fresh whole milk – with 0.201% weight in US CPI) than for goods in ELI 18031 
(potato chips and snacks – with 0.212 weight in US CPI), since whole milk typically constitutes 
a larger portion of a household expenditure than a particular brand of snacks. 
Despite these problems we assume that, for a given ELI, a high value of weight in 
expenditure in CPI means the average good included in the ELI constitutes a large portion of 
household expenditure for customers who buy it and so is subject to intensive search for the best 
price. Therefore we expect a positive correlation between the probability of price adjustment for 
goods included in a given ELI and its weight in CPI. 
3.2. Regression Results for U.S. Data. 
We first regress the probability of price changes on the expenditure weights. All 
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where Probi is the average monthly probability of price change and wi is the weight in 
expenditure of a given ELI, i=1…350. εt represents unobserved heterogeneity across goods.  t-
statistics are shown in brackets. The coefficient on ELI weight has the expected sign and is 
significant at the 10% level; we comment on the economic significance below.  
Intensity of search for the best price may be affected by non-price differences between 
goods (like quality differences across different sellers) and hence good type may be correlated 
with the frequency of price changes. On the average, services are the most heterogeneous, 
followed by manufactured goods and durable foodstuffs; perishable foodstuffs are the most 
homogeneous.
13 Furthermore, these types are correlated with the weight in expenditure: the 
average weight is the highest for the service-type ELI and the lowest for the perishable 
foodstuffs. This may lead to a significant ommited variable bias in regression (15). 
                                                 
13 Bils and Klenow (2004) find that the probability of price change is three times larger for raw goods than for 
processed goods (see their Table 2). Raw goods are, on the average, more homogeneous than processed goods and, 
for given price differences, are subject to more intensive search. We discuss this issue below.   18
To account for this heterogeneity we introduce good type dummies. The resulting 
regression is: 
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where d, m and s are dummy variables for durable foodstuffs, manufactured goods and services, 
respectively (the omitted group is perishable foodstuffs). The results confirm the effect of non-
price heterogeneity and the possible bias: with dummies for good type included, the effect of the 
weight in expenditure on the probability of price changes is more than twice as large and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  
The estimated coefficient means that goods with a 0.1% higher weight in expenditure 
have about 1% higher frequency of price changes, which is clearly economically significant.
14 
Also, it means that an increase in the weight in expenditure by one standard deviation is 
associated with an increase in the frequency of price changes by about a quarter of a standard 
deviation (across the ELIs, the standard deviation of the weights in expenditure is 0.37% and of 
the frequency of price changes it is 15%).  
  The weights in CPI expenditure vary greatly across ELIs. The combined weight of the 
top 15 ELIs is 25%, of the bottom 15 ELIs it is 0.07% of expenditure. The probability of 
adjustment in some heavy-weight ELIs is high (the top 15 ELIs include three types of gasoline 
and airline fares), while in some it is low (local phone charges and physician's services). Hence 
the results may be driven by outliers. To check whether this is the case we run regression (16) on 
various subsamples, selected by excluding ELIs with the highest weights. For all subsamples the 
coefficient on expenditure weight is positive; for most it is significant at the 1% level. 
15 
Overall these results provide strong support for the joint hypothesis that (i) the more 
intensive is search for the best price, the more often are prices changed and that (ii) ELIs’ 
weights in CPI are a sufficient proxy for search intensity.  
 
                                                 
14 Note that due to the infrequent observation bias, the estimated coefficient on ELI weight is biased towards zero. 
15 For example, if we exclude the top 15 ELIs, the coefficient for expenditure weight is 15.1 and is significant at the 
1% level, while if we exclude the top half, it is 64.6 and is significant at the 10% level (the large value of the 
coefficient is due to the reduced variation in the right-hand side variable, which also exaplains the high standard 
error).   19
3.3. Polish Data and Further Empirical Evidence. 
We now turn to the second source of empirical evidence – a proprietary data set on 
several goods and services in Poland. While it is much less comprehensive than the BLS data, it 
consists of actual prices at the level of individual goods/stores. These data were collected to 
analyse the effects of search for the best price on price behaviour, in particular on the dispersion 
of prices of identical products across stores, which is the focus of our earlier paper (Konieczny 
and Skrzypacz, 2000). For that analysis we created classifications of goods by search 
characteristics; we use the same classifications here. They follow Stigler’s (1961) suggestions 
more closely and look at various aspects of search: expenditure on a given good, the size of 
individual purchase and the frequency of purchases. In addition we can test model predictions on 
the relationship between search and adjustment size. The CPI inflation rate is much higher in this 
sample, so price changes are more likely caused by monetary shocks than in the US data.  
The data are a subset of the price information which the Polish Central Statistical Office 
(GUS) collects in order to calculate the CPI. GUS compiles price information on 1500-1800 
products in 307 districts. For each good, the price is checked in one store in each district (Bauc et 
al, 1996, p. 55). Out of this set we obtained, for the period 1990-96, data on prices of 55 goods, 
each in 47 stores (districts). The 47 districts consist the complete set for four out of 49 Polish 
administrative regions, called voivodships. The main criterion for including a good in our 
subsample was that it be precisely defined and remain unchanged throughout the studied period 
(excluding, for example, “a microwave oven” which may be a different good in different stores 
or time periods). 78 goods and services in the GUS data met this criterion. Of these we 
eliminated goods sold in packages of different size or whose packaging has changed during the 
study period, goods with regulated prices, and goods with many missing observations. Out of the 
55 remaining goods, 38 are groceries (20 perishable and 18 storable), 4 are sold in 
cafeterias/cafes, 10 are nongrocery items and 3 are services. Summary statistics on the 
probability and the size of price changes are in Table 1. The list of the goods and various 
classifications are in Appendix B.  
For a subset of goods prices were checked several times a month in each store. To assure 
uniformity, we use the first observation in each month. Each month the maximum number of 
observations in our dataset is 2585; the actual number is smaller as data from some stores are 
missing; the proportion of missing data is about 20%.   20
As some data are missing, we compute the probability of price changes by dividing the 
number of price changes by the number of observations in which we could have observed a price 
change, i.e. the number of cases when we have two consecutive price observations. This measure 
is an unbiased estimator of the probability of price change as long as the process generating 
missing data is independent of the pricing policies of the stores. There are 37817 price changes 
(30493 increases and 7324 decreases) and 115914 cases with two consecutive observations. The 
probability ranges from 0.38 in 1992 to 0.28 in 1996. Note that, to avoid the effect of the uneven 
number of observations on the averages, the numbers in Tables 1 and 2 are computed with equal 
weight attached to each good and each month. For example the average probability of price 
change in 1992-96 is computed as  1996 12 55
1992 1 1 Prob ( Prob )/ Tt iitT itT N == = ∑∑ ∑ = , where ProbitT is the 
probability of price change for good i in month t in year T and NitT = 5*12*55 is the number of 
values of ProbitT in the summation. The average size of price changes is computed in the same 
manner. 
The average probability of price changes is about 1/3. It is not much higher than in the 
US data despite the fact that the inflation rate is an order of magnitude greater. As can be seen in 
Table 1, the ranking of good types by the probability of adjustment is identical to that in the US 
data: the probability is the highest for perishable foodstuffs, followed by durable foodstuffs, 
manufactured goods and services. The picture for the probability of price increases and decreases 
is similar. The probability of price changes for individual goods is in Appendix B; a comparison 
with other studies is in Table 2.  
Table 1 also shows the size of price changes. The average price increase (the values for 
decreases are in brackets) is 11.0% (8.4%, respectively). Price increases (decreases) are the 
largest for services: 22% (15%), followed by manufactured products: 12% (9%), durable 
foodstuffs: 11% (8%) and perishable foodstuffs: 7% (6%). Information on individual goods is in 
Appendix B.  
Data Issues. 
While the Polish data set is much less comprehensive than Bils and Klenow (2004) data, 
it has several advantages. The data are for individual items rather than for groups of goods. An 
important feature is the absence of temporary sales (i.e. price reductions which are followed by a 
return of the price to the previous level), such sales are common in other data sets. For example 
Kackmeister (2002) reports that about 22% of all price changes are due to temporary sales; see 
also Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi (2003). The data consist of actual transaction prices, since   21
quantity discounts or coupons were rare or nonexistent during the study period. Promotional 
packaging (i.e. 120g for the price of 100g) was virtually unknown. 
Polish Transition.  
The data set is potentially unusual as Poland switched to a market economy in 1990. In 
two companion papers (Konieczny and Skrzypacz, 2000, 2005, hereafter KS1 and KS2, 
respectively) we analyzed various aspects of individual price behaviour. We found that the initial 
behaviour was different than in later years. This initial transition period was brief: using the 
definition employed in KS1
16, it lasted longer than a year for only 6 out of the 55 goods. We 
concluded that transition was definitely over by the end of 1991. Therefore we restrict our 
analysis to the 1992-96 period. The results for the entire period are, virtually, identical.  
Importance of Search for the Best Price.  
While the data are from a relatively new market economy, we strongly believe they are 
well suited to analyze search. Prior to 1990 Poland was a planned economy and prices were 
identical in all stores. Shortages were common, especially at the end of the 1980s. This led 
Polish shoppers to become expert searchers for the availability of goods. The big-bang market 
reforms in January 1990 freed most prices from government control.
17 Stores were allowed to set 
prices of goods they sell and shortages quickly disappeared.
18 In the new environment goods 
were available but prices differed across stores. Casual evidence suggests that the experienced 
searchers quickly switched from search for availability to search for the best price. In KS1 we 
find that, consistent with Stigler (1961), search determines the level of price dispersion for 
homogenous goods; we provide more details below. Therefore we concluded that the data are 
well suited for a test of the model. 
Spurious Price Changes.  
Some price changes in our sample may be caused by changes in the store being sampled. 
GUS price inspectors were instructed to collect price quotations for the same good in the same 
store, or in a nearby store when the good is temporarily unavailable, but changes in stores were 
not recorded. Additionally, during the period of the study the retail sector in Poland underwent 
                                                 
16  We analyzed the behaviour of price dispersion across stores for individual goods. It is, initially, high but falls 
rapidly. Transition is assumed to end in the month in which the dispersion falls below its average value in the next 
three, six and twelve months. 
17  Some prices were freed in September 1989. As of January 1990, prices of over 90% of goods and services were 
set by market forces. Regulated prices included rent, utilities, electricity, gasoline, domestic cigarettes and some 
alcohols.  The share of administered prices in CPI was between 10.6 and 12 % from 1990 on (EBRD Transition 
Report, 1999). 
18 See Sachs (1993) for a description and discussion of Polish reforms.   22
significant transformation, in particular with respect to store ownership and the appearance of 
substitutes. Most of these changes took place in the 1990-91 period, which is excluded from the 
empirical analysis. In most cases, the goods in our sample remained the basic staple and new 
substitutes were significantly more expensive. If, in the end, many price changes were caused by 
changes in the retail sector and those changes were more prevalent in markets with more 
intensive search, we may be detecting spurious correlations. 
Infrequent Observation Bias.  
As in the case of the US data, the cross-sectional differences in the probability of price 
changes are biased downwards. On the other hand, infrequent observations need not lead to a 
reduction in the cross sectional variability of the size of price changes. If we observe 0< Pijt-1 < 
Pijt, we compute the size of adjustment as (Pijt-1 -Pijt)/ Pijt-1.  This formula yields incorrect results 
whenever there are multiple price changes during month t. The cross-sectional variation of 
adjustment size will be underestimated if price changes in month t are all increases, or all 
decreases. Underestimation need not happen if the price changes are in the opposite direction.  
The Polish data provide an idea about the issues created by the infrequent observations 
bias. For a subset of goods in the Polish data set (goods 1-38 – foodstuffs and goods 49-52 – café 
and cafeteria items) there are three observations a month in 1991-96. There are between 13% (in 
1995) and 26% (1991) more price changes in the high-frequency data. Multiple price changes do 
not alter the cross-sectional picture of the frequency of price changes or their size: across goods, 
the coefficient of correlation between the probability of price changes in monthly and in high 
frequency data is over 0.95 in each year, and the correlation for adjustment size is over 0.96 in 
each year. We conclude that, while the consequence of infrequent observations is to bias the 
estimated coefficient towards zero, it is unlikely to affect  the qualitative nature of the results. 
3.4. Proxies for Search Intensity in Polish Data. 
We use the proxies for search intensity developed in KS1, where we analysed the impact 
of search on the differences in price levels across stores. For that analysis we divided the goods 
on the basis of three characteristics: (a) the weight of the given good in household expenditure, 
conditional on the household buying the good  (b) the value of a single purchase, (c) the 
frequency of purchases and (d) a summary measure of total search intensity.  The last 
characteristics tries to aggregate all factors relevant to search - the three above as well as omitted   23
factors which do not fall neatly into any of the three other characteristics.
19 As we did not have 
direct information on these characteristics, our classification is subjective. We divided the goods 
independently into categories within each characteristic and reconciled the rankings. To 
minimize arbitrariness, within each characteristic the goods were divided into only three 
categories: high, medium and low.  
This approach to obtaining search proxies, which was dictated by the lack of non-price 
information in the data has, nonetheless, several adventages. It allows us to follow Stigler’s 
(1961) suggestions more closely and look at various aspects of search. The characteristics do 
measure different aspects of search behaviour in the data: the coefficients of correlation between 
different characteristics vary from  –0.19 (between the value of a single purchase and purchase 
frequency) and 0.86 (between the weight in expenditure on a given good and the value of a 
single purchase. Our treatment of the characteristic (a) avoids the mismeasurement of the 
importance of household expenditure of goods bought by few households (for example good 21 
– baby formula is important for households with babies, but its weight in aggregate expenditure 
is small). 
We use this classification in KS1 to analyze the effect of search on the differences 
between price levels for the same good sold by different stores. Sorensen (2000) argues that the 
more active is search, the smaller are the differences between price levels across goods. This 
means that price differences should be, on the average, smaller for goods in the high category in 
each characteristic than in the medium and in the low categories, and for the medium than for the 
low category. Our empirical results in KS1 are clear-cut. Depending on the comparison, between 
80% and 100% of differences are as expected. These results indicate that search matters in the 
Polish data and that our classification is a good proxy for search intensity. 
It should be noted that, while the dispersion of prices across stores, and the average 
frequency of price changes are closely related in our model, in empirical applications these 
issues are quite different. In the model we assume that the only source of heterogeneity in a 
given market is the timing of price changes. The average price in every store is the same and so 
the larger is the dispersion of prices, the lower is the frequency of price changes. In our data, 
                                                 
19 For example, live carp is usually bought for Christmas or Easter holidays; its weight in expenditures, the 
frequency of purchases and the amount spent on a single purchase are low, but search for the best price is intensive. 
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however, the average price levels differ across  regions (voivodships). For the typical good, 
prices across regions vary more than prices across stores.
20  
 The classification of products into these categories is in Appendix B. The method of 
ranking the goods may seem arbitrary so we urge the Reader to examine Appendix B and 
compare a few goods with different rankings.  
We use the same classifications here to analyze the relationship between search intensity 
and the size and frequency of price changes. The characteristics are related to the market-specific 
variables in our model as follows: 
- A good with high amount spent in a single purchase constitutes a large portion of expenditure 
of a household who buys it in a given month (for example good 41 – a bicycle). This corresponds 
to a high value of k.  
- If a good is purchased frequently, a possible strategy for a consumer is to continue purchasing 
at the same store, once a sufficiently low price is found.
21 Hence one search may lead to several 
purchases and the average cost of search per shopping trip is low. This corresponds to a low 
value of C.
 22 For example, the average cost of search for inexpensive bread (goods 18-20) is 
lower than the cost of search for vinegar (good 36).  
- If a good constitutes a large share of expenditure, it is bought frequently (low C) or/and the 
amount spent on a single purchase is large (high k).   
- Finally, while the total search intensity classification is not precisely defined and so cannot be 
directly attributed to any specific variables in our model, any of the market variables will do, as 
the effect of search variables on the size and frequency of price changes is unambiguous in our 
model.  
3.5. Results for Polish data. 
In Figure 3 we plot the computed probability of a price change, as well as 95% 
confidence intervals, for each category in the four characteristics (the picture for increases is 
virtually identical). Since some goods are seasonal and monthly probabilities are quite volatile, 
the values are 12-month averages. For example, the value in December 1992 is computed as the 
                                                 
20 The coefficient of variation of the the average voivodship prices  is of similar size to the coefficient of variation of 
the price level across stores within a voivodship. The average prices are computed from between three and 
seventeen individual observations. 
21 As argued by Stigler (1961) this requires that prices in stores be positively correlated over time. In our data the 
rank correlations between successive prices in a given store is in the range 0.8-0.98. 
22  Our formal model assumes a single purchase by a short-lived household. A different way of treating frequent 
purchases is through a higher k, interpreted as a possibility of purchasing several units in a period of time  which is 
short relative to the usual length of time between price adjustments.    25
number of price changes in 1-12/1992, divided by the number of two consecutive observations in 
12/1991-12/1992. 
We expect the probability to be the highest in categories marked as h (most active search) 
and the lowest in categories marked as l (least active search). It is clear from Figure 3 that the 
results are as predicted for the share in expenditure, frequency of purchases and search intensity 
characteristics.  The only exception is the highest category in the “amount spent” category, 
where price changes are rare. Formal analysis below, however, shows that this is due to the 
omission of other variables. 
To analyze the relationship more formally, we regress the probability of price changes on 
category dummies, own inflation rate, good type dummies and time dummies. Model 1 involves 
estimating the following regression:
 23 
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where Probit  is the probability of  price change for good i  in month t, expressed in percent. The 
data used in the regressions are monthly, unlike the data plotted in Figure 3, which are 12-month 
averages. I
h and I
m are dummy variables, equal 1 for the high and medium search intensity 
categories, respectively, and zero otherwise; INF is the nationwide inflation rate for good i in 
month t (also expressed in percent);  d, m and s are, as before, dummies for durable foodstuffs, 
manufactured goods and services, respectively (the omitted type is perishable foodstuffs) and 
T
G
is a vector of time dummies (total of 59, one for every month in the data).  t values are in 
brackets. A “*” following a coefficient estimate denotes it is significantly different from zero; a 
“+” following a coefficient estimate denotes that it is significantly higher than the coefficient on 
the next dummy, both at 5% level against a two-sided alternative. For example the coefficient on 
the high search intensity dummy, I
h, is significantly different from the coefficient on the medium 
search intensity dummy, I
m; both are significantly different from zero. 
INF is included on the right hand side to control for the effect of inflation on the 
frequency of price changes. It is better than alternative measures of inflation (for example CPI) 
as there are large relative price changes in the sample. Time dummies are included to allow for 
calendar/seasonal effects not captured by the inflation rate. They are jointly significant.  
                                                 
23 The number of observations used to calculate the dependent variables differs across goods. Therefore in all 
regressions we have corrected for heteroscedasticity by multiplying the variables by the square root of the number of 
observations used to calculate the dependent variable.   26
In estimating Model 1 we use search intensity separately from the other classifications as 
it summarizes all factors relevant to search. The results confirm predictions of the model. The 
coefficients on the high and medium search intensity dummies show the difference between 
adjustment probabilities relative to the omitted low category. The probability of price change is 
the highest in the high search intensity category and the lowest in the low category; all the 
differences are significant at the 5% level. Note that this is despite the fact that, due to the 
infrequent observation bias, the differences between categories are probably underestimated.  
We also find that the probability of price changes increases with inflation and that prices 
of perishable foodstuffs change most often, followed by prices of durable foodstuffs and 
manufactured products; prices of services change least frequently. All results are highly 
significant, both economically and statistically. The difference in the probability of price change 
between the high and low search intensity categories is a bit larger than the standard deviation of  
average frequencies for the different goods (see Table 1). It is also equivalent to about 6% higher 
average monthly inflation rate.  
  Model 2 involves estimating the same equation, but we replace the search intensity 
dummies with dummies for the other three classifications. The results are: 
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where E, F and A denote the share in expenditure, frequency of purchases and amount spent on a 
single purchase, respectively. The results are, again, consistent with the predictions of the model. 
All the differences are as expected; all are significant at the 5% level, with the exception of the 
high category in the classification by share in expenditure. Note that, unlike suggested by Figure 
3 (in which good category is the only explanatory variable) the  probability of price change in the 
“high expenditure on a single purchase” category is, as predicted by the model, higher than in the 
medium category. 
  In columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 we repeat the tests with the probability of price increase as 
the dependent variable.  The results are virtually identical to those obtained for the probability of 
price change. Finally, in the last two columns of Table 3, we report the results for models 1 and 2   27
with the percentage price increase as the dependent variable. The results for model 1 are 
consistent with our predictions. In model 2 however, price changes for high frequency of 
purchases category are larger than for the other categories, and some results are not statistically 
significant. Price increases are smallest for perishable foodstuffs and largest for services.
24    
Proposition 2 (c) provides an additional test of the model, not related to the division of 
goods by search characteristics. It implies a negative correlation between the coefficient of 
variation of price levels, CV= STD[P]/E[P], and the probability of price changes. The estimated 










    (19) 
The coefficient on CV means that an increase of coefficient of variation by 10% corresponds to a 
7.5% drop in frequency of price changes. 
  To conclude, results obtained with the Polish data provide strong evidence for the joint 
hypothesis that, as predicted by the menu cost model with consumer search, the higher is search 
intensity the more frequent and smaller are price changes and that our classification adequately 
captures search incentives.  
4. Potential Explantion of Differences Across Broad  Good Categories. 
  While our focus is on the analysis of pricing decision at the level of individual goods, in 
this section we consider the differences in the probability of price changes across broad good 
categories. These differences are striking and consistent across countries. In the seven 
comprehensive data sets (for U.S., Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Portugal and Spain) as 
well as in the five smaller sets (for Poland, Germany, Holland, Italy and Luxemburg) the 
probability of price change is always the highest for perishable foodstuffs, followed by durable 
foodstuffs, manufactured goods and services. In the European studies, the probability of price 
changes for energy products is even higher than for perishable foodstuffs (except for Portugal, 
where energy prices are regulated) – see Dhyne (2005), table 3. Furthermore, Bils and Klenow 
find that prices are changed more often for raw rather than manufactured products. Finally, price 
                                                 
24 It is worth noting that, while higher inflation is associated with larger price changes, the effect is smaller than in 
the case of probability of price changes. A 1% higher value of INF raises the probability of a price increase 
(probability of price change) by about 3% (2%, respectively) while the size of price increase rises by 0.2%. It is 
broadly consistent with our model – as Figure 1 shows for the calibrated parameters the effect of inflation on 
frequency is an order of magnitude larger than on size of price increases.   28
changes in Poland are the largest for services, and the smallest for perishable foodstuffs (see 
Table 3).   
  We illustrate a potential explanation of these differences with a simple extension of our 
model, based on differentiation of goods within broad categories. Assume that, for each good, 
there are N varieties. Each store sells M < N randomly chosen varieties. Consumer preferences 
are lexicographic: each consumer buys only one variety. Varieties are symmetric: each is sold by 
the same proportion of stores, and consumed by the same proportion of customers. This means 
that, when choosing a store at random, a consumer finds a variety she will buy with the 
probability M/N  and so the expected cost of a single search is cN/M. 
  This simple extension of our model implies that the more differentiated are goods within 
a market (as measured by N/M), the greater are the (expected) search costs and so the less 
frequent, and bigger, are price changes. Although product heterogeneity is difficult to measure, 
our intuition is that it is the largest in services, followed by manufactured goods, durable 
foodstuffs, perishable foodstuffs and energy products, with large variations within these 
categories. Also, product heterogeneity is larger for manufactured than for raw products. Hence 
our model potentially explains the observed differences between broad product groups. Of 
course, a proper test would require a way to measure, as well as new data on, the product 
heterogeneity across markets.  
5. Alternative Explanations. 
In this section we consider alternative explanations of the price behaviour reported here. 
Most of the arguments are based on the Polish data, since they are more detailed and allow the 
testing of alternatives. Clearly, the data show inflexibility of nominal prices at the level of an 
individual seller. Any alternative theory must, therefore, explain why nominal prices do not 
adjust continuously. There are many real stickiness theories, for example coordination failures 
(Ball and Romer, 1991), market concentration or collusion or the recent costly information 
theories (Mankiw and Reis, 2002) but they cannot explain why firms do not change nominal 
prices in continuous fashion. Moreover, in the Polish data nominal price changes are large and 
infrequent even in 1990, when the new market environment is being established.
25 It is not likely 
that strategic considerations, long term relationships or imperfect information play important 
                                                 
25 Despite rapid inflation and the need to adjust pricing structure to market forces, the average size of price change 
for the first 37 goods in 1990, for which we have weekly data, is over 10%. Except for January 1990, prices stay 
unchanged for well over a month.   29
roles in these circumstances. Therefore we concentrate on alternative theories of nominal 
rigidity.  
Time-Contingent Policies. 
One possibility is that firms follow time-contingent policies, i.e. change prices at regular 
intervals, and the intervals are, for some reason, shorter in markets in which search for the best 
price is more intensive. In the absence of priors it is, of course, difficult to rule out policies that 
have a mixture of time- and state-contingent components. Assume, for example, that, as long as 
inflation is below 30% per year, a store changes prices of eggs every 40 days and of bread every 
65 days. Discovering such patterns in the data is not practical, especially given the fact that some 
observations are missing. 
For constant, deterministic inflation our model is observationally equivalent to a time-
contingent Calvo-Taylor type model. At the very least, our findings show that this frequency of 
price changes varies significantly with the intensity of customer search for the best price and 
other good characteristics. Furthermore, in regressions (17) and (18) (as well as in Table 3) we 
find that inflation affects the frequency and size of price changes, so that the pricing rules are not 
fully time contingent. So, if time-contingent considerations are present, they are of secondary 
importance in the Polish data. In the US data, even if firms follow time-contingent policies, they 
are affected by search considerations. 
Price-Contingent Policies 
Kashyap (1995) proposed an alternative explanation of nominal price rigidity. According 
to his theory, certain values of nominal prices are preferred, for example round prices or prices 
ending in 9. With aggregate inflation, a firm delays nominal price adjustment until it is optimal 
to change price to the next pricing point. To make the terminology consistent, we will call such 
policies price-contingent policies. We call prices ending in 9, 99, etc tantalizing prices, while 
prices ending in a zero will be called round prices. 
In the absence of priors we selected prices as being round on the basis of a simple 
criterion: consecutive round numbers were allowed to differ by between 2% and 5%.These 
values are smaller than the average size of price change and so the choice is not restrictive. 
Tantalizing prices were defined as prices just below the corresponding round price.
26 In what 
                                                 
26 The values of prices in the Polish data range from 0.0026 to 400 PLN (on January 1, 1995 the currency was 
redenominated at the rate 1PLN=10000zl; we use data denominated in the new currency, which explains the very 
low price). Round prices are defined as 10
i-4 * {x},  i = 1,…,6;  {x}={1.00,1.05,…,2.00,2.10,…,5.00,5.25,…,10.00}.   30
follows we discuss the results for the proportion of prices that are either round or tantalizing; the 
latter prices are rare in the Polish data and so the results are identical if we look only at round 
prices. 
Price contingent policies are, in a sense, similar to time-contingent policies; it is the price, 
rather than time of adjustment, that is not chosen optimally. The loss from suboptimal price may 
be larger in markets where search is intensive, and so price-contingent policies can provide a 
potential explanation of the patterns in our data. Indeed, we find that the more intensive is 
search, the less frequent are pricing points. For example, for search intensity, the proportion of 
prices that are equal to pricing points is 0.355 for the high category, 0.504 for the medium 
category and 0.526 for the low category. Pricing points are most common for services, followed 
by manufactured goods, and least common for perishable foodstuffs.
27 
  To check whether the relationship between search intensity and the probability and the 
size of price changes is affected once we control for the proportion of pricing points we add 
PPPit to the right side of regression (17)
28 
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The addition of the proportion of pricing points as an explanatory variable has little effect 
on our previous results. While the value of some coefficient changes, their sign or significance is 
not affected. The proportion of pricing points has a strong positive effect on the frequency of 
price changes, significant at the 1% level. (The standard deviation of the average propotion of 
pricing points for different goods is 17%, so a one-standard-deviation increase in PPP 
corresponds to Prob increasing only by 0.2 standard deviation, so the effect is economically less 
significant than of the search categories). The results for the probability of price increase and the 
size of price changes are similarly unaffected. 
  Overall, we conclude that, while search intensity affects the proportion of pricing points, 
price-contingent policies cannot explain the patterns of price changes in the Polish data. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
The values of tantalizing prices are 10
i-4 * {y}, i = 1,…,6;  {y} = {{1.04-1.049}, {1.09-1.099},…,{1.94-1.949}, 
{1.95-1.999},{2.09-2.099},{2.19-2.199},…,{4.89-4.899},{4.95-4.999},{5.2-5.249},…,{9.7-9.749},{9.9-9.999}} 
27 Álvarez and Hernando (2004), Aucremanne and Dhyne (2004) and Baumgartner et al (2004) also find a negative 
correlation between the frequency of price changes and the proportion of pricing points. 
28 G
G
 is a vector of good types (d, m, s).   31
Temporary Sales. 
Another possible explanation is that the observed frequency of price changes is generated 
by temporary sales. Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi, (2003) analysed temporal patterns of price 
behaviour at the Dominic chain of grocery stores in Chicago. They find that the loss-leader 
model explains the behaviour of prices during demand peaks. Popular goods are often put on sale 
in order to attract customers to visit the store; the price is subsequently raised to the previous 
level. Using the same data set, Rotemberg (2002) illustrates the price behaviour of a particular 
product (Nabisco premium saltines) over a period of eight years (see his Figure 1). While price 
changes (down and up) are numerous, there are only five “regular” prices, defined as the price 
before and after a temporary sale. Temporary sales are frequent and the total number of price 
changes is an order of magnitude higher than the number of changes of the “regular” price. All 
changes in the “regular” price are increases. This illustrates the difficulty in analysing data 
collected with infrequent observations.  
It is possible that, in the US data, the loss-leader approach to pricing leads to more 
frequent price changes for goods for which search for the best price is intensive. But temporary 
sales are very rare in the Polish data and so they cannot explain the patterns of price behaviour 
reported here.  
Sticker-Price Model. 
Diamond (1993) proposed a sticker price model as an explanation of nominal price 
rigidity. Whenever a good is delivered to a seller,  a price sticker is attached to each item and the 
good is sold at the (constant) nominal price until old stock runs out. The price sticker is never 
changed. This is a potential explanation of the price pattern in our data. In markets in which 
search is intensive, the loss from having a suboptimal price is large. If a firm cannot change the 
price of a good already in inventory, it would order new stock in smaller batches and change 
prices more often. 
  If the Diamond (1993) model explains price behaviour, the effect of search on the 
frequency and size of price changes would hold only for goods with sticker prices. To check this 
we ran regressions (17) and (18) using data for goods priced without the use of stickers. These 
include goods sold by weight as well as services: goods 1-14, 18-20, 31, 35 and 49-55. 
Regression results, not reported here for brevity, are very similar to those obtained using the 
entire data set. In model 1 the coefficients on the search intensity dummies are as predicted and   32
the differences are significant at the 5% level. In model 2, the results for the share of 
expenditure, frequency of purchase, and the medium category in the amount spent classification 
are as predicted. The results are significant at the 5% level, except for the medium category in 
the share in expenditure classification. Overall, since the price behaviour is qualitatively the 
same for goods priced with, and without, stickers, the Diamond (1993) does not explain the 
behaviour of prices in our data. 
Customer Reluctance. 
Rotemberg (2002) proposed recently an alternative explanation of nominal price 
stickiness. It is based on the idea that some price changes are perceived by customers as unfair, 
and so avoided by firms. As long as the new price is perceived as fair, customers accept it and do 
not react negatively by withdrawing purchases or switching to other suppliers. The implications 
of the model differ from those based on menu costs; in particular, adjustment frequency depends 
on observable economy-wide variables. 
While Rotemberg’s model is quite stylised, its implications are similar to those of our 
model provided that there are menu costs and if consumer resistance leads to smaller and more 
frequent price changes. Buyers of frequently purchased goods are better informed and able to 
identify unfair price increases and so customer resistance is more relevant for these goods. 
Fairness is more relevant for goods which constitute a large portion of expenditure and for 
expensive goods. Therefore, for the three characteristics, Rotemberg’s model also predicts 
smaller and more frequent price changes for the high groups. The main difference between the 
two models is in the effect of aggregate variables. In our model they affect the frequency of price 
changes indirectly, through their effect on the search process. In Rotemberg’s model they have 
more direct effect, by affecting resistance to price changes (for example a depreciation of 
currency would make price increases more acceptable for goods with significant imported 
inputs). The best way to distinguish between our and Rotemberg’s model is through careful 
analysis of the effect of aggregate variables on the size and frequency of price changes. Our data 
are not sufficient for such a test. 
6. Conclusions.   
In this paper, we establish a new empirical finding: search for the best price affects the 
frequency of price changes at the level of individual goods. We show that the relationship 
between search intensity and adjustment frequency can be derived in a simple model in which   33
firms face menu costs and heterogeneous customers search for the best price. These predictions 
are shown to hold in very different environments and for various measures of search intensity.  
Our approach provides a cross-sectional test for the menu cost model. There are several 
advantages of looking at cross-sectional, rather than time-series, behaviour of prices. In the menu 
cost model, the optimal pricing policy depends on the expected rate of inflation. Our test avoids 
the difficulty of calculating the expected inflation rate in individual markets. It can be used when 
there is little variation in inflation rate over time, which makes it difficult to identify the time-
series effects (as in, for example, Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2003). Finally, testing does not require 
long data series.  
Further progress of this literature requires more empirical work using large, 
disaggregated data sets. The availability of such data has improved recently and provides an 
opportunity for such research. The Dominick data at Chicago GSB, the data sets used by Bils and 
Klenow (2004), Klenow and Kryvtsov (2003), the European data sets, scanner data as well as 
data from the Internet provide large, high quality data sets. However, the time series are short 
and the inflation rate is relatively stable, making it difficult to use the traditional test of the menu 
cost model. As our test does not require long data series or large variations in the inflation rate, it 
may be particularly suited for use with the new data sets. 
Simulations of the model show that it does a reasonable job at tracing the relationship 
between inflation and the frequency of price changes for high-inflation economies, but greatly 
underestimates the frequency for low-inflation economies. These results are consistent with a 
related study by Golosov and Lucas (2003). There are three main differences between their 
model and ours. In their model, the environment is stochastic, there is no search, and firms face 
not only aggregate, but also relative shocks. They calibrate the model to reflect the 
inflation/probability relationship in Klenow and Kryvtsov’s (2003) (low inflation) as well as in 
Lach and Tsiddon’s (1992) (high inflation) data. Unlike ours, their model does a good job for 
both high and low inflation. They then redo the simulations assuming away relative shocks. This 
has little effect for the high inflation data but leads to significant underestimation of the 
frequency of price changes for low inflation data.  They interpret the findings as suggesting that, 
in low-inflation economies, a vast majority of price adjustment is the result of relative rather than 
aggregate shocks. In our model there are no relative shocks and the frequency of price changes is 
underestimated in low inflation environments. Both studies suggest that, in the presence of menu 
costs, price adjustment at the individual level may be dominated by inflation when it is high, and   34
by relative shocks when it is low. Our empirical results for the US data suggest that customer 
search for best price affects the frequency of price changes regardless of whether the nominal 
price is suboptimal because of real or nominal shocks. 
Our results have important implications for general-equilibrium modeling of the effect of 
nominal rigidities on real variables. As state-contingent models are difficult to solve, researchers 
often adopt the Calvo-Taylor time-contingent approach. The probability of price changes is 
estimated from the data. The model is then calibrated under the assumption that the probability is 
fixed. Our results suggest that this procedure maybe ill-suited for policy prescriptions as the 
“Calvo probability” varies across markets depending on the search intensity (and other 
characteristics) and hence should be treated as an endogenous parameter. 
Appendix A. 
Proof of Lemma. 
The solution to the firm’s problem is characterized by equations (11). For a given value of E[P], 
it is sufficient to show that (11b) has a unique solution. It can be simplified to:  
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Note that, at  1 = σ , the left hand side of (A1) is positive. Its derivative with respect to σ has the 


















At  1 = σ the first term equals zero and so the derivative is positive. For σ >1 the expression with 
σ  is negative and strictly decreasing, so the derivative changes sign from positive to negative at 
most once. This means the left hand side of (A1) is either monotonic or strictly quasiconcave. As 
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indeed, (11b) has a unique solution. 
For the second part of the lemma we use the implicit function theorem. Rewrite (11b) as: 
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The term in brackets is positive by assumption. So  0 >
dk
dσ
. The proofs for the effect of v, C and 
MC on σ are identical. QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
Equation (A1) can be rewritten as:   35
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σ h . From (11c) E[P]=h(σ)(C/k+MC). Combining this with (A3) we obtain that the 
equilibrium is a solution to: 
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The LHS of (A5) is a function of σ which is strictly quasiconcave and 
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, there is a solution and this solution is 
unique. That condition is equivalent to  k C b gm MC / / 2 − > . QED 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
(a) Notice that the solution to (A5) is on the upward sloping part of  ) (σ G . This implies that the 
solution increases as the RHS of (A5) rises. So the solution is increasing in  gm and decreasing 
in MC and b; using b=vk
2 /C it is easy to see that the solution is decreasing in v and k.  Finally, 
the derivative of the RHS of (A5) with respect to C has the same sign as (MC-C/k), which is 
positive by assumption and hence the equilibrium value of σ is increasing in C. 
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As σ  is increasing in m and C (if MC>C/k ) and decreasing in MC, v and k,  the frequency is 
decreasing in m and C and increasing in MC, v and k.  
For the last claim note that g increases both the numerator and denominator of fr. The optimal 
price bounds S,s get further apart but, at the same time, the real price is eroded at a higher rate. 
To prove that the first effect dominates, solve (A5) for g and substitute it in the equation for the 
frequency: 
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Equation (A6) expresses frequency as a function of σ alone, and we know that σ increases in g. 
It turns out that, as long as  k C b gm MC / / 2 / − > , this function is increasing in σ over the 
interval in which (A5) has a solution, so we are in the range where fr is increasing in g. 
The proof of part (c) is straightforward. QED   36
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Name # Type E F A S change incr. decr. change incr. decr.
Back bacon "Sopocka", 1 kg 1 p h h m h 0.40 0.32 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04
Sausage "Krakowska sucha", 1kg 2 p h h m h 0.38 0.31 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05
Sausage "Mysliwska sucha", 1kg 3 p h h m h 0.38 0.31 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.05
Sausage "Krakowska parzona", 1kg 4 p h h m h 0.39 0.33 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.05
Sausage "Zwyczajna", 1kg 5 p h h m h 0.43 0.34 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.05
Pork wieners, 1kg 6 p h h m h 0.41 0.32 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.05
Sausage "Torunska", 1kg 7 p h h m h 0.42 0.34 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05
Sausage "Zywiecka", 1kg 8 p h h m h 0.38 0.32 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.04
Eggs, each 9 p h h m h 0.71 0.42 0.28 0.16 0.13 0.10
Carp, live, 1kg 10 p l l l m 0.36 0.26 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.07
Herring, salted, 1kg 11 p l m m m 0.28 0.23 0.05 0.11 0.08 0.07
Sprats, smoked, 1kg 12 p l m m m 0.28 0.23 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.08
Cheese "Gouda", 1kg 13 p m h l h 0.46 0.35 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.05
Cheese "Edamski", 1kg 14 p m h l h 0.46 0.36 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.05
Butter, 82.5% fat, 250g 15 p h h l h 0.50 0.35 0.15 0.11 0.06 0.05
Margarine "Palma", 250g 16 p h h l h 0.40 0.34 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.06
Veggie butter, 250g tub 17 p h h l h 0.43 0.36 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06
Rye bread, 1kg 18 p h h l h 0.31 0.28 0.02 0.15 0.10 0.10
Bread "Baltonowski", 1kg 19 p h h l h 0.33 0.30 0.03 0.13 0.09 0.08
Bread "Wiejski", 1kg 20 p h h l h 0.33 0.29 0.03 0.12 0.10 0.10
Powdered baby formula, 500g 21 d h m m h 0.40 0.34 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.05
Flour "Tortowa", 1kg 22 d m m l h 0.35 0.29 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.05
Flour "Krupczatka", 1kg 23 d m m l h 0.29 0.25 0.04 0.12 0.09 0.05
Flour "Poznanska", 1kg 24 d m m l h 0.37 0.30 0.06 0.16 0.08 0.05
Pearl barley "Mazurska", 1kg 25 d l l l m 0.31 0.25 0.05 0.15 0.11 0.07
Sugar, 1kg 26 d h m l h 0.43 0.33 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.07
Plum butter, 460g jar 27 d m m l m 0.30 0.24 0.07 0.13 0.11 0.08
Jam, blackcurrant, 460g jar 28 d m m l m 0.33 0.25 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.08
Apple juice, 1 liter box 29 d m m l m 0.37 0.27 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.08
Pickled cucumbers, 900g 30 d m m l m 0.37 0.27 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.08
Candy "Krowka", 1kg 31 d m m l m 0.39 0.34 0.05 0.11 0.09 0.07
Cookies "Delicje szampanskie", 1kg 32 d m m l m 0.32 0.27 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.06
Cookies "Petit Beurre" type, 100g 33 d m m l m 0.32 0.27 0.05 0.14 0.11 0.10
Pretzel sticks, 100g 34 d m m l m 0.31 0.26 0.05 0.15 0.12 0.11
Halvah, 1kg 35 d m m l l 0.32 0.26 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.07
categories of price:  of price Good
Appendix B
Classifications and statistics for Polish goods
Search Probability  Size40
Name # Type E F A S change incr. decr. change incr. decr.
Vinegar, 10%, 0.5l bottle 36 d m m l m 0.26 0.20 0.06 0.15 0.10 0.09
Citric acid, 10g bag 37 d llll 0.24 0.19 0.05 0.31 0.25 0.18
Tea "Madras", 100g 38 d h m m h 0.25 0.21 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.09
Vacuum cleaner, type 338,5 39 m l l h h 0.28 0.25 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.06
Kitchen mixer, type 175,5 40 m l l h h 0.26 0.24 0.02 0.11 0.09 0.05
Folding bicycle “Wigry-3" 41 m l l h h 0.27 0.22 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.06
Radio receiver "Ania" 42 m l l h h 0.19 0.17 0.02 0.13 0.11 0.10
Razor blade "Polsilver", each 43 m l m l l 0.17 0.14 0.02 0.22 0.20 0.14
Toothpaste "Pollena", 98g 44 m m m l m 0.29 0.25 0.04 0.25 0.12 0.11
Shaving cream 45 m l m l m 0.28 0.24 0.05 0.29 0.12 0.13
Sanitary pads "Donna", box of 20 46 m m m m h 0.27 0.21 0.05 0.16 0.10 0.06
Paint thinner, 0.5l 47 m llll 0.23 0.19 0.04 0.17 0.13 0.10
Radiator coolant “Borygo” or “Petrygo” 48 m llll 0.18 0.15 0.02 0.28 0.16 0.07
Mineral water in cafeteria, 0.33l bottle 49 s m m l l 0.14 0.11 0.03 0.27 0.26 0.15
Boiled egg in a cafeteria, each 50 s m m l l 0.43 0.27 0.16 0.20 0.16 0.11
Mineral water in a café, 0.33l bottle 51 s m m l l 0.16 0.13 0.02 0.32 0.25 0.17
Pastry "W-Z" in a café, each 52 s m m l l 0.23 0.19 0.04 0.16 0.16 0.10
Car-wash, of car: "FSO 1500" 53 s mmmm0.12 0.12 0.01 0.27 0.23 0.15
Varnishing of hardwood floor, 1m
2 54 s l l h h 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.29 0.19 0.22
ECG test 55 s l l m l 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.35 0.29 0.18
Notes:
Good types: 
      p - perishable foodstuffs; d-durable foodstuffs, m - manufactured goods, s - services
Search characteristics:  
      E - by importance in expenditure, F - by search frequency,
      A - by amount spent on a single purchase, S - by search intensity
Search categories within characteristics:
       h - high, m - medium, l - low
Appendix B continued
Classifications and statistics for Polish goods
Search Probability  Size
Good  of price of price: categories41
All goods Services Manuf.
goods durable perishable
CPI Inflation rate (% per year) 2.7
Probability of price change, % 23.3 11.8 23.6 24.7 38.3
                    Standard deviation 15.0 12.6 13.6 6.2 11.6
CPI Inflation rate (% per year) 29.9
Probability of price change, % 32.2 18.3 24.2 33.1 40.2
                    Standard deviation 10.9 11.8 4.7 5.3 9.3
Probability of price:   increase, % 26.0 14.5 20.7 26.7 31.9
                                 decrease, % 6.2 3.8 3.4 6.3 8.3
Average size of:        increase, % 11.0 22.0 11.8 10.5 7.2
                                 decrease, % 8.4 15.4 8.8 8.0 6.2
Table 1




Study Country Goods Period Inflation Percentage 
rate, % difference
per year actual predicted predicted-actual
1992-96 30 0.32 0.32 0%
1990 95 0.60 0.59 -1%
1991 60 0.43 0.47 8%
1992 44 0.38 0.39 3%
1993 38 0.34 0.36 7%
1994 30 0.31 0.31 1%
1995 22 0.30 0.26 -13%
1996 19 0.28 0.23 -17%
Lach and Tsiddon Israel foodstuffs 1982 133 0.61 0.70 14%
Tomassi Argentina foodstuffs 1990 70 0.46 0.51 10%
Lach and Tsiddon Israel foodstuffs 1978-6/79 58 0.39 0.46 18%
Sheshinski, Tishler, Weiss Israel cofee (noodles) 1973-8 40 0.35 (0.27) 0.37 6%(37%)
Ratfai Hungary meats 1993-6 18 0.41 0.23 -44%
Dahlby Canada car insurance 1974-82 8.6 0.08 0.14 88%
Fisher and Konieczny Canada newspapers 1976-89 6.1 0.02 (0.04) 0.12 480%(190%)
Kashyap US catalogue apparel 1953-87 4.1 0.07 0.09 34%
Cecchetti US magazines 1953-79 4.0 0.01-0.04 0.09 120%-780%
Chakrabarti and Scholnick books 3/2000-4/01 3.1 0.17 0.07 -55%
Alvarez and Hernando Spain 70% of CPI 1993-2001 3.4 0.13 0.08 -39%
Bills and Klenow US 70% of CPI 1995-7 2.7 0.26 0.07 -73%
Dias, Dias and Neves Portugal 95% of CPI 1997-2001 2.6 0.22 0.07 -70%
Aucremanne and Dhyne Belgium 68% of CPI 1989-2001 2.2 0.17 0.06 -64%
Vilmunen and Laakonen Finland 100% of CPI 1997-2003 1.8 0.20 0.05 -74%
Baumgartner et al Austria 90% of CPI 1996-2003 1.6 0.15 0.05 -68%
Beaudry et al France 65% of CPI 1994-2003 1.5 0.19 0.05 -76%
Levy et al US supermarket 1991-2 1.0 0.67 0.04 -95%
Notes:
   Fisher and Konieczny: the first number is for single copy, the second for weekly delivery, respectively.
   Chakrabarti and Scholnick - data are from Amazon.com and BarnesandNoble.com
Table 2
Evidence on Inflation and the Frequency of Price Changes
Low inflation
Konieczny and Skrzypacz





Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Deg. of Freedom 3234 3230 3234 3230
R
2
0.571 0.577 0.453 0.542
Independent Variables
1
HIGH 0.035 * -0.090 *
Share in  t value 2.599 -17.360
Expenditure MEDIUM 0.028 * -0.089 *
t value 2.532 -20.456
HIGH 0.099 *+ 0.110 *+
Frequency  t value 5.020 14.315
of Search MEDIUM 0.031 * 0.007
t value 2.997 1.717
HIGH 0.061 *+ -0.077 *+
Amount spent on  t value 6.175 -20.077
a single purchase MEDIUM 0.017 * 0.000
t value 2.989 0.144
HIGH 0.093 *+ -0.052 *+
Overall  t value 13.503 -18.090
Search Intensity MEDIUM 0.056 * -0.045 *
t value 7.720 -14.587
INF 2.977 * 2.969 * 0.168 * 0.141 *
t value 44.274 44.351 5.920 5.445
durable food -0.026 * 0.021 0.030 * 0.126 *
t value -4.927 1.682 13.327 26.461
manufactured -0.077 *‡ -0.024 *‡ 0.037 *‡ 0.112 *‡
t value -12.357 -2.262 14.046 26.832
services -0.164 *‡ -0.139 *‡ 0.131 *‡ 0.242 *‡
t value -16.006 -9.886 30.412 44.139
Notes:
* denotes coefficient significantly different from zero (at 5% significance level against two-sided alternative)
+ denotes High coefficient significantly different from Medium coefficient (at 5% sig. level, two-sided alternative)
‡ denotes category dummie significantly different from the category above (at 5% sig. level, two-sided alternative)
In all regressions we have included a constant and dummies for each period of observations, but to save 
space we do not report those parameters.
Table 3
Dependent Variable:    Probability of price increase44
Note: the dashed vertical lines denote the callibrated point: g = 2.23%, C=0.34 and v=30.
Figure 1
Effect of Changes in Parameter Values on the Price Bounds,
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Freq. (left scale) Size (right scale)45
Notes: 
    Simulation parameters chosen to fit 1992-96 average in Polish data (P92-96).
    Price change probability in Levy et al is 67%, inflation is 0.08%; it is omitted from the lower panel for clarity
Abbreviations: 
    Pi, i=90…96: Polish data 1990-96;   STW1 (2): Sheshinski, Tishler and Weiss: cofee (noodles)
    Lach and Tsiddon1(2): 1982 (6/1978-1979);     Fisher and Konieczny1(2): weekly delivery (single copy)
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